THE SLEEPING BEAUTY
Full-length ballet in Three Acts
Music: Pyotr Ilyich Tchaikovsky
Choreography: Marius Petipa
Libretto: Marius Petipa and Ivan Vsevolozhsky
after stories by Charles Perrault
Sets: Lev Solodovnikov
Costumes: Simon Virsaladze
The Sleeping Beauty, a crowning jewel of Marius Petipa's career, is often considered the finest achievement of the Classical ballet. It is a grandiose and refined blending of the traditional mime, expressive pas d'action and spectacular divertissements in a lavish theatrical setting. Tchiakovsky was delighted with the invitation to write the music for a ballet based on Charles Perrault's well known fairy tale. A baby princess, condemned at her christening by an evil fairy to prick her finger and die on her 16th birthday, is saved by the gift of the good Lilac Fairy, who declares the princess will only sleep until awakened by the kiss of a prince. The fairy tale replete with a king and queen, fairies both good and evil, a beautiful princess and dream prince, magical stage effects, and courtly splendor, lent itself perfectly to the full evening ballet that was Petipa's pride.
Although different productions have cast the kingdom of King Florestan and his queen in varying centuries, it is really a storybook kingdom set in the realm of the imagination. In the Prologue, the hall of the palace where the christening is about to take place is resplendent with color, and imposing with its high ceilings and great stone archways. The master of ceremonies, pages, heralds, ladies in waiting, and finally the King and Queen all promenade into the royal setting, looking most distinguished in their elaborate dress. Next, the fairies of the kingdom join the scene of courtly pageantry with the Lilac Fairy, six cavaliers and maids of honor entering last. All dance in honor of the King and Queen and baby Aruora, about to be christened, Each of the fairies dances her own solo, presenting a gift to the Princess. The dances of no real dramatic significance are an example of Petipa's use of the well timed divertissement. Just as the Lilac Fairy finishes her dance a strange and frightening rumble is heard. Its meaning soon becomes clear: the master of ceremonies has forgotten to invite the evil fairy Carabosse! The grotesque woman, her face a white mask, her long dress black and tattered enters in a huge black coach drawn by four ugly rats. Stepping down, she gesticulates with her hand and threatens with her stick that they will have to pay the price for their omission. In mime, she delivers the ominous curse that the Princess will prick her finger on a spindle and die. The master of ceremonies is in disgrace, the King and Queen are in despair. But the Lilac Fairy has not given her the gift. She steps forward and assures the royal court that on her 16th Birthday the princess will indeed prick her finger, but then fall asleep for 100 years. Carabosse speeds off in a rage while the
others surround the infant's cradle as if to protect her from further harm.
ACT I
The Spell
Act I opens at Aurora's 16th birthday party. Brightly clad peasant girls dance a divertissement with flower garlands. Holding the arched garlands overhead, they dance in multiple circles, weaving in and out to a waltz tempo. All await the arrival of the Princess Aurora. The ballerina princess bursts on the scene, dancing a brief and vivacious solo in the manner of a carefree young girl. She is then ceremoniously introduced to the four princes who have come to seek her hand. The Rose Adagio, the famous pas d'action expressive of a young girl's blossoming into womanhood, is about to start. Aurora begins the adagio standing in attitude: one leg is raised and bent behind her, one curved arm is raised overhead. Some have read in this pose, which Aurora repeats often, a kind of gentle questioning or youthful uncertainty. One after the other, each of the suitors turns and displays her while she maintains the attitude pose. She releases the hand of the suitor supporting her and raising both of her arms overhead, balances momentarily, as if tentatively testing her abilities. She then takes the arm of the next prince and begins the sequence again. After a brief interlude in which the princess dances alone, she returns to accept a rose from each of the suitors (hence the title Rose Adagio). She pirouettes slowly and accepts each rose; one prince supports her while the next offers his flower. At the end of the Adagio, she returns to her attitude position, and supported in turn by each prince, she again releases her hand and balances for a little longer each time. Finally, as she frees her hand from the clasp of the fourth prince, she again releases her hand and balances for a little longer each time. Finally as she frees her hand from the clasp of the fourth prince, the curved attitude straightens into a sharp, arabesque extension. She retains her balance poised confidently on one toe, as if she has visibly come of age before the eyes of the adoring suitors. The Princess continues dancing a joyful solo until her attention is suddenly distracted by a strange woman dressed in black who offers her an unfamiliar object. Before anyone can stop her, Aurora seizes the dread spindle. The unwary Princess pricks her finger, grows weaker, and falls to the floor in a swoon. Just as those assembled lapse into despair, the Lilac Fairy steps forward. Waving her wand soothingly, she reminds them that the Princess will only sleep and she casts everyone into deep slumber along with her. The Lilac Fairy summons a forest of thorns, thickets, and enormous
shrubbery to grow around the sleeping court.
ACT II
Scene One: The Vision
Act II takes us to a neighboring kingdom 100 years later. Prince Charming and his lord and lady friends are out for a hunt. The cheerful retinue amuse themselves with dances and games, but the Prince is tired of everyday diversions and stays behind to wander about alone. Suddenly the Lilac Fairy floats in on a boat with gossamer sails. She offers to show the meloncholy Prince a vision of Aurora. The Prince is utterly enchanted by the sight of the Princess dancing lyrically and romantically amidst a tableau of fairies and nymphs, bathed in a bluish light. He pursues her but can only hold the Princess in his arms for a moment before she eludes him and disappears. She is after all only a spectral image conjured up by the Lilac Fairy. The Fairy offers to take the Prince across the lake, through the dense and tangled forest, to the castle where the real Princess lies asleep.
ACT II
Scene Two: The Awakening
The Prince approaches the canopied bed set on a high platform and, as the music heightens, he plants the awakening kiss. Aurora greets him. The King and Quenn appear from either side of the stage and welcome the awakened Aurora and her Prince with joy.
ACT III
The Wedding
The final act ushers us into a sumptuous hall, graced with statuesque columns and a circular gold staircase crowned by a blue sky. It is here that the Royal wedding of Prince Charming and Princess Aurora will take place. A full series of celebratory divertissements is performed by the inhabitants of fairyland. Puss 'n Boots, Bluebeard and his wife, Goldilocks and a Bear, Little Red Riding Hood and the Wolf all dance. A highlight is the pas de deux of the soaring Blue Bird and his Princess. First dancing together and then separately, they compete with each other spinning and fluttering in sparkling flight, sometimes jumping so high they seem virtually suspended in the air. The man's variation in particular, which features many beating jumps while he arches his body backwards and forward (brises voles) is one of the most famous and demanding in the international repertory. The bluebird's dance ends with the female lifted on the male's shoulder. The celebration then climaxes with the Grand Pas de Deux danced by the Prince and Princess. They are regal, formal and confident dancing together. Prince Charming supports his bride's pirouettes and displays her long extensions and secure balances. The Prince jumps and spins during his solo and the Princess spins on pointe with even surer mastery than she showed in the Rose Adagio. Finally, Aurora
whirls into the Prince's arms and dives toward the floor; the Prince catches her around the waist and supports her in the famous inverted pose known as the fish dive. All join the bride and groom for a spirited mazurka and the Lilac Fairy, standing in their midst, bestows her blessing on the happy couple.
The Sleeping Beauty was the first of Petipa's classics to be seen in Western Europe. Under the title The Sleeping Princess, it was presented by Serge Diaghilev (1872-1929) in London in 1921. In 1939, it was remounted in Great Britain and has been considered the foundation of the Classical ballet repertory in that country ever since. It has now been adopted worldwide, and performance of the leading role remains a kind of initiation rite for aspiring ballerinas.
The Sleeping Beauty is a supreme demonstration of the challenge of Petipa's style - steel point work, sharply accented spinning turns, soaring leaps, high extensions, brilliant battery (beats in the air), daring lifts and, in addition, it gives a fairy tale plot lavish stage treatment. However, its production actually checked a growing tendency toward shapeless extravaganza in 19th century ballet, adhering closely to the principle of choreographic symphonism: meaning that, like the composition of a symphony, it had a certain formal structure. The Sleeping Beauty was choreographed in strict association with Tchaikovsky's music. There are themes developed and resumed throughout the ballet, and each act is a unity unto itself. Tchaikovsky willingly took instruction from Petipa as to the length tempo and character of each musical sequence ( as he would also do in The Nutcracker). The themes - a young girl's coming of age and the triumph of good over evil are developed dramatically and musically during the course of the ballet. Each of the three acts includes an adagio for Princess Aurora, the first celebrating her girlhood, the second her falling in love, and the third her marriage. In these pas d'actions, Petipa makes fuller use than previous choreographers of the dramatic potential of the Classical ballet, as for example, when Aurora's curved (questioning) attitudes become sharp (exclamatory) arabesques and her balances grow steadily surer.
Friday, November 14, 2008
Beauty or Make Up Preparations,
Beauty or Make Up Preparations,
Soap and Preparations for the Care of Skin
1. Industry Overview
The cosmetics industry is one of the fastest growing sectors not only in Thailand, but the entire Asian region as well. The year 1997 saw the fastest growth period in the cosmetic industry, with a growth rate of 20 percent. Although the economic crisis has had a negative impact on consumption levels, results during 1999-2000 show the cosmetics industry’s growth rate is at 15 percent with an average market value of approximately 10,800 million Baht.
During the initial stages of industrial development, there were very few manufacturers of cleansing and skin-care cosmetics. Most manufacturers were foreign companies who established a production base in Thailand. The majority of cleansing, skin-care products, and cosmetics that were distributed to the market were imported. The only customers who had the means to afford these products were the upper-class who had a high degree of purchasing power. The high price of imported products was a weakness as they were too expensive for middle and lower class customers. However, this lack of affordability presented an opportunity for investors to establish a cosmetics production base in order to meet the desire of those less affluent customers. In this way, the production of cleansing and skin-care cosmetics in Thailand has expanded and developed continually.
2. Production
In 2000 current figures released by the Thai Cosmetic Association has shown that the cosmetic industry in Thailand is composed of 300 factories. For the medium factory, the capacity stands at 50 tons/day while for a small factory, the capacity is 10 tons/day. For the large manufacturers, mostly supported by foreign capital, their capacity is between 100-200 tons/day.
The current situation regarding the production of cleansing and skin-care cosmetics is as follows:
• Cleansing and skin-care products have traditionally come from two sources: local production and imports from overseas
• Leading imported brand manufacturers were very interested in the development of a production base in Thailand, with the objective of distributing the products domestically as well as exporting to foreign countries
• The development of a production base in Thailand by brand leaders encouraged Thai personnel to improve their knowledge and skill in production and management
• The current main target market for imported products are upper-class customers followed by middle-class customers who have increased their purchasing power
• The current main target market for locally produced products with Thai brand names are middle-class and lower-income customers
Industrial production of cleansing and skin-care products is closely monitored by The Food and Drug Administration, Ministry of Public Health under the law of cosmetics as outlined in the legislative act of 1992 (Thai year 2535). As for production quality control, product quality and standard of products accepted by customers in the market, all must be in accordance with the details of the legislative act of cosmetics which manufacturers must abide by, as follows:
• Readiness and suitability of officers involved directly and indirectly with the production of cosmetics
• Readiness and suitability of plant location, production equipment especially in the case of specially controlled cosmetics production
• Quality of raw material used for production
• Quality of containers for products
• Clear explanation of label as prescribed by the Ministry
With the establishment of a production base in Thailand by brand leaders, a great revolution of industrial production occurred in the field of cleansing and skin-care cosmetics, and the number of new competitors increased for both importers and manufacturers. This market expansion led to the continual development among manufacturers who had their production base in Thailand. Some good quality products were distributed locally while some manufacturers had the ability to develop their products for export.
The five largest cosmetic and skin care manufacturers include:
1. International Laboratories Corp., Ltd.
2. U.B. Chemical Industry Ltd.
3. Rubia Industries Ltd.
4. Navasri Manufacturing Ltd.
5. Inchcape Manufacturing Co., Ltd.
3. Domestic Markets
The Thai domestic market was a principal market for manufacturers. All customers were somewhat highly sensitive to price. The expansion of the market depended on the overall economic situation, expanding when times were good, contracting when the economy soured. In the highly competitive market, most manufacturers not only tried to improve product quality and develop a variety of product types, but also sought to use pricing as their principle tool for competition.
Domestic markets for cosmetics are divided into make up and skin care products with a total market value of 9,000 million Baht. The total market value is expected to increase by 10 percent per year. Consequently, entering this industry appears to be a very attractive option for a number of new investors, both local and international alike. For the most part, Thai manufacturers have focused more on natural products, while international manufacturers have their own brand name. Sampling tests have been used to spur demand in the market, especially to increase consumption among teenagers and male consumers.
For cosmetic products, the majority of consumers are female (97 percent) who are over 18 years of age. It is estimated that 15 million Thai people apply cosmetic products regularly and spend 10-20 percent of their monthly income on cosmetics.
In 2000, the value of imports increased 31.4 percent or 2,158.7 million Baht. The major importing markets include the United States, Japan, France, the United Kingdom and China, accounting for 35.5 percent, 15.9 percent, 13.9 percent, 7.0 percent and 6.8 percent respectively of the total export market.
Soap and Preparations for the Care of Skin
1. Industry Overview
The cosmetics industry is one of the fastest growing sectors not only in Thailand, but the entire Asian region as well. The year 1997 saw the fastest growth period in the cosmetic industry, with a growth rate of 20 percent. Although the economic crisis has had a negative impact on consumption levels, results during 1999-2000 show the cosmetics industry’s growth rate is at 15 percent with an average market value of approximately 10,800 million Baht.
During the initial stages of industrial development, there were very few manufacturers of cleansing and skin-care cosmetics. Most manufacturers were foreign companies who established a production base in Thailand. The majority of cleansing, skin-care products, and cosmetics that were distributed to the market were imported. The only customers who had the means to afford these products were the upper-class who had a high degree of purchasing power. The high price of imported products was a weakness as they were too expensive for middle and lower class customers. However, this lack of affordability presented an opportunity for investors to establish a cosmetics production base in order to meet the desire of those less affluent customers. In this way, the production of cleansing and skin-care cosmetics in Thailand has expanded and developed continually.
2. Production
In 2000 current figures released by the Thai Cosmetic Association has shown that the cosmetic industry in Thailand is composed of 300 factories. For the medium factory, the capacity stands at 50 tons/day while for a small factory, the capacity is 10 tons/day. For the large manufacturers, mostly supported by foreign capital, their capacity is between 100-200 tons/day.
The current situation regarding the production of cleansing and skin-care cosmetics is as follows:
• Cleansing and skin-care products have traditionally come from two sources: local production and imports from overseas
• Leading imported brand manufacturers were very interested in the development of a production base in Thailand, with the objective of distributing the products domestically as well as exporting to foreign countries
• The development of a production base in Thailand by brand leaders encouraged Thai personnel to improve their knowledge and skill in production and management
• The current main target market for imported products are upper-class customers followed by middle-class customers who have increased their purchasing power
• The current main target market for locally produced products with Thai brand names are middle-class and lower-income customers
Industrial production of cleansing and skin-care products is closely monitored by The Food and Drug Administration, Ministry of Public Health under the law of cosmetics as outlined in the legislative act of 1992 (Thai year 2535). As for production quality control, product quality and standard of products accepted by customers in the market, all must be in accordance with the details of the legislative act of cosmetics which manufacturers must abide by, as follows:
• Readiness and suitability of officers involved directly and indirectly with the production of cosmetics
• Readiness and suitability of plant location, production equipment especially in the case of specially controlled cosmetics production
• Quality of raw material used for production
• Quality of containers for products
• Clear explanation of label as prescribed by the Ministry
With the establishment of a production base in Thailand by brand leaders, a great revolution of industrial production occurred in the field of cleansing and skin-care cosmetics, and the number of new competitors increased for both importers and manufacturers. This market expansion led to the continual development among manufacturers who had their production base in Thailand. Some good quality products were distributed locally while some manufacturers had the ability to develop their products for export.
The five largest cosmetic and skin care manufacturers include:
1. International Laboratories Corp., Ltd.
2. U.B. Chemical Industry Ltd.
3. Rubia Industries Ltd.
4. Navasri Manufacturing Ltd.
5. Inchcape Manufacturing Co., Ltd.
3. Domestic Markets
The Thai domestic market was a principal market for manufacturers. All customers were somewhat highly sensitive to price. The expansion of the market depended on the overall economic situation, expanding when times were good, contracting when the economy soured. In the highly competitive market, most manufacturers not only tried to improve product quality and develop a variety of product types, but also sought to use pricing as their principle tool for competition.
Domestic markets for cosmetics are divided into make up and skin care products with a total market value of 9,000 million Baht. The total market value is expected to increase by 10 percent per year. Consequently, entering this industry appears to be a very attractive option for a number of new investors, both local and international alike. For the most part, Thai manufacturers have focused more on natural products, while international manufacturers have their own brand name. Sampling tests have been used to spur demand in the market, especially to increase consumption among teenagers and male consumers.
For cosmetic products, the majority of consumers are female (97 percent) who are over 18 years of age. It is estimated that 15 million Thai people apply cosmetic products regularly and spend 10-20 percent of their monthly income on cosmetics.
In 2000, the value of imports increased 31.4 percent or 2,158.7 million Baht. The major importing markets include the United States, Japan, France, the United Kingdom and China, accounting for 35.5 percent, 15.9 percent, 13.9 percent, 7.0 percent and 6.8 percent respectively of the total export market.
Quantum Sleeping Beauty
Quantum Sleeping Beauty
Peter J. Lewis
plewis@miami.edu
The Sleeping Beauty paradox in epistemology and the many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics both raise problems concerning subjective probability assignments. Furthermore, there are striking parallels between the two cases; in both cases personal experience has a branching structure, and in both cases the agent loses herself among the branches. However, the treatment of probability is very different in the two cases, for no good reason that I can see. Suppose, then, that we adopt the same treatment of probability in each case. Then the dominant ‘thirder’ solution to the Sleeping Beauty paradox becomes incompatible with the tenability of the many-worlds interpretation.
Consider first the many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics, and in particular what happens when an observer measures the x-spin of a spin-1/2 particle whose state is an eigenstate of z-spin. According to the many-worlds interpretation, the observer branches into two successor observers, one of whom sees the result ‘spin up’ and the other of whom sees the result ‘spin down’. Call the original (pre-measurement) branch b0¬, the branch in which the observer sees ‘spin up’ b1, and the branch in which she sees ‘spin down’ b2. Compare this to a simplified version of the Sleeping Beauty paradox. Sleeping Beauty is woken up on Sunday, and told the following: “We will wake you for an hour on Monday, and for an hour on Tuesday, and on Monday night we will administer a drug that will cause you to forget the Monday waking.” Her room contains no indication of what day it is. Call the time at which she is awake on Sunday t0, on Monday t1¬, and on Tuesday t2.
Note the parallels between the two cases. In the many-worlds case, the agent at b0 is straightforwardly psychologically continuous with the agent at b1, and straightforwardly psychologically continuous with the agent at b2; however, the agents at b1 and b2 are not psychologically continuous with each other. Similarly in the Sleeping Beauty case, the agent at t0 is straightforwardly psychologically continuous with the agent at t1 and with the agent at t2, but the agents at t1 and t2 are not straightforwardly psychologically continuous with each other due to the memory erasure. That is, in each case the personal experience of the agent exhibits a branching structure.
Furthermore, note that in each case the agent gets lost in this branching structure. This is clearer in the Sleeping Beauty case; when she wakes up, she no longer knows whether it is Monday or Tuesday. That is, at t1 and t2 she is uncertain of the truth-value of some self-locating beliefs, such as “Today is Monday” (Elga 2000). She could use a probability measure to quantify this uncertainty; presumably she should assign a probability of 1/2 to “Today is Monday” on the basis of some kind of indifference principle. In the case of the many-worlds interpretation, the parallel uncertainty can be produced by supposing that the observer is blindfolded; at b1 and b2, she knows that the measurement has taken place, but she doesn’t know whether the result is ‘up’ or ‘down’ (Vaidman 2002a). Again, she is uncertain of the truth-value of some self-locating beliefs, such as “The result is ‘up’ in this branch” (Ismael 2003). And again, she could use a probability measure to quantify this uncertainty; she should assign a probability of 1/2 to the cited belief, on the basis of the Born rule.
Hence in both the many-worlds case and in the Sleeping Beauty case, there is a branching structure to subjective experience, which induces a loss of self-location information, and the resulting uncertainty can be quantified using a probability measure. However, there is also a significant difference between the two cases, namely in the treatment of probability before the branching event. According to the many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics, the observer should assign a probability of 1/2 to each measurement outcome even at b0. That is, the treatment of probability in the many-worlds case is just as if exactly one of the two outcomes occurs, where each outcome has an objective chance of 1/2. But there is no analogous pre-branching probability assignment in the Sleeping Beauty case; there is no sense in which Sleeping Beauty at t0 should assign a probability of 1/2 to each of Monday and Tuesday. To what beliefs could she assign such probabilities? “Today is Monday” has a probability of 0 at t0; she knows that today is Sunday. “I will wake up on Monday” has a probability of 1 at t0; she knows that she will wake up on Monday (or at least, that she is psychologically continuous with someone who will wake up on Monday). There are no obvious candidates for a belief about Monday to which Sleeping Beauty should assign a probability of 1/2 at t0. Hence the treatment of probability in the Sleeping Beauty case is not just as if she is woken up on exactly one of Monday and Tuesday with an objective chance of 1/2 each.
Of course, similar considerations can be raised in the many-worlds case, too. To what beliefs, at b0, can the observer assign a probability of 1/2? “The result is ‘up’ in this branch” has a probability of 0 at b0, since this branch (b0) contains no measurement results. “I will see the ‘up’ result” has a probability of 1, since the observer knows that she will see this result (or at least, that she is psychologically continuous with someone who will). Again, there are no obvious candidates for a belief concerning the results to which she should assign a probability of 1/2 at b0.
Nevertheless, many authors have argued that a pre-measurement probability assignment of 1/2 to the two results is appropriate in the many-worlds case. Saunders (1998) and Wallace (2005) argue that the branching structure of the observer’s experience makes the observer genuinely uncertain concerning what will happen to her; hence it makes sense for her to assign a probability of 1/2 to “I will see the ‘up’ result” at b0. Vaidman (2002a) argues that even though the observer is only genuinely uncertain after the measurement, nevertheless she should act as if she is uncertain even before the measurement, and this underwrites an effective probability assignment of 1/2 to “I will see the ‘up’ result” at b0. Papineau (2004) and Greaves (2004) argue that a probability assignment need have nothing to do with uncertainty; a probability assignment of 1/2 to “I will see the ‘up’ result” at b0 indicates how much the observer cares about her successor at b1 relative to her successor at b2.
My goal here is neither to defend nor to attack these argument strategies, but merely to note that they all remain controversial, and that if any such strategy works, it ought to work just as well in the structurally similar Sleeping Beauty case. That is, given the parallels between the two cases, then all other things being equal, we should expect the two cases to be covered by a uniform account of probability. But as it stands, the treatments of pre-branching probability are not parallel. This leaves us with two options—applying the treatment of pre-branching probability from the Sleeping Beauty case to the many-worlds case, and applying the many-worlds treatment to the Sleeping Beauty case.
According to the first option, the treatment of probability in the Sleeping Beauty case is correct; Sleeping Beauty should assign a probability of 1/2 to both “Today is Monday” and “Today is Tuesday” at t1 and at t2, but she should assign a probability of 1 to both “I will wake up on Monday” and “I will wake up on Tuesday” at t0. Applying this to the many-worlds case, the (blindfolded) observer should assign a probability of 1/2 to both “The result is ‘up’ in this branch” and “The result is ‘down’ in this branch” at b1 and b2, but she should assign a probability of 1 to both “I will see the ‘up’ result” and “I will see the ‘down’ result” at b0. The trouble with this option is that it fatal to the many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics; the observer’s pre-measurement predictions contradict the Born rule, which forms the empirical heart of quantum mechanics. That is, quantum mechanics requires that non-trivial probabilities be assigned to measurement results before the measurement has occurred, and if the many-worlds interpretation cannot deliver such probabilities, then it is untenable as an interpretation of quantum mechanics. Indeed, this is precisely why the authors cited above take such pains to try to justify pre-measurement probability assignments in the many-worlds interpretation.
So let us consider the second option, namely that the treatment of probability by the advocates of the many-worlds interpretation is correct. According to this option, the quantum observer should assign a probability of 1/2 to both “I will see the ‘up’ result” and “I will see the ‘down’ result” at b0, so analogously, Sleeping Beauty should assign a probability of 1/2 to both “I will wake up on Monday” and “I will wake up on Tuesday” at t0. That is, in both cases the branching process is treated as if it were an instance of objective chance, where just one branch occurs. This is highly counter-intuitive in the Sleeping Beauty case; as Elga notes, on Sunday Sleeping Beauty was “already certain that [she] would be awakened on Monday” (2000, 145). But perhaps our intuitions here are wrong, and perhaps one of the arguments mentioned above for the many-worlds case can show why they are wrong.
However, more is at stake here than our intuitions. To see this, consider the full Sleeping Beauty paradox, rather than the simplified version considered so far. On Sunday, Sleeping Beauty is told that a coin will be tossed. If the coin comes up tails, then she will be woken up on Monday and on Tuesday with memory erasure in between, as in the simplified version. If the coin comes up heads, then she will be woken up on Monday alone. (It doesn’t matter for present purposes if the coin toss is interpreted as a classical event described by objective chance or as a quantum event described by many-worlds branching.) The question at the heart of the paradox is what probability Sleeping Beauty should assign to ‘heads’ when she wakes up at t1. The dominant (‘thirder’) view is that the answer is 1/3 (Elga 2000); the minority (‘halfer’) view is that the answer is 1/2 (Lewis 2001).
Suppose we impose the treatment of probability required for the tenability of the many-worlds interpretation on the full Sleeping Beauty paradox. Recall that the treatment of probability here is as if each branch has an objective chance of 1/2 of occurring. In the Sleeping Beauty case, this means we can treat the situation as if Sleeping Beauty is told that when the coin comes up tails, she will be woken up either on Monday or on Tuesday, with equal (objective) probabilities. That is, we can treat the situation as if there are two coins tosses, where Sleeping Beauty will be woken up on Monday (but not Tuesday) if the first coin come up heads, on Monday (but not Tuesday) if the first comes up tails and the second comes up heads, and on Tuesday (but not Monday) if both come up tails. But if this is the right way to analyze the situation, then the paradox dissolves, and the halfer solution is clearly correct. After all, the motivation for the thirder solution is Sleeping Beauty’s rational expectation at t0 that she will be woken up twice as often if the (initial) coin-toss comes up tails as if it comes up heads. But on the current understanding of Sleeping Beauty’s rational expectations, there is no such asymmetry; whatever the result of the (initial) coin-toss, she expects to be woken up once, although if the result is tails then she is uncertain as to which day she will see.
This analysis is straightforwardly applicable if the account of probability in the many-worlds interpretation involves genuine pre-branching uncertainty (as Saunders (1998) and Wallace (1995) maintain). Given such uncertainty, Sleeping Beauty should treat equal-amplitude branching just like a classical coin-toss, and hence she should view her situation as just like the case of two consecutive coin-tosses just described. Put another way, if Sleeping Beauty is genuinely uncertain at t0 about whether, given that the (initial) coin-toss comes up tails, she will be woken up on Monday or on Tuesday, then her epistemic situation doesn’t change between t0 and t1¬. All that changes is her point of view; at t1, she is uncertain whether, given that the coin came up tails, she is currently awake on Monday or on Tuesday. But without a change in epistemic situation, there is no occasion for her to change the probability assigned to ‘heads’ between t0 and t1, and at t0 that probability is clearly 1/2.
But even if the account of probability in the many-worlds interpretation does not involve pre-branching uncertainty, all authors agree that the account must underwrite behavior exactly as if there was genuine uncertainty, in order for it to count as an account of probability (Greaves 2004, 442; Papineau 1996, 238; Vaidman 2002a). But in that case, Sleeping Beauty must behave exactly as if she is uncertain whether, given that the coin comes up tails, she will be woken up on Monday or on Tuesday. And part of behaving that way, as has just been argued, is being willing to bet on ‘heads’ at even odds at t1. Hence if the treatment of probability by the advocates of the many-worlds interpretation is correct, in any of its forms, then the dominant thirder solution to the Sleeping Beauty paradox must be rejected in favor of the halfer solution.
The argument here assumes that there is no disanalogy between the many-worlds case and the Sleeping Beauty case that could justify different treatment of probabilities. But this might be challenged. For example, in the many-worlds case, the probabilities are related to the amplitude of the branch via the Born rule, and there is nothing analogous to branch amplitude in the Sleeping Beauty case. But note that this disanalogy is unrelated to the question of whether the relevant probabilities can be assigned prior to the branching event, which is the question at issue here. If there are further disanalogies between the two cases, the argument needs to be made. Otherwise, the parallels between the cases constrain your options: If you are a thirder, you must reject the many-worlds interpretation, and conversely, if you accept the many-worlds interpretation you must be a halfer.
Peter J. Lewis
plewis@miami.edu
The Sleeping Beauty paradox in epistemology and the many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics both raise problems concerning subjective probability assignments. Furthermore, there are striking parallels between the two cases; in both cases personal experience has a branching structure, and in both cases the agent loses herself among the branches. However, the treatment of probability is very different in the two cases, for no good reason that I can see. Suppose, then, that we adopt the same treatment of probability in each case. Then the dominant ‘thirder’ solution to the Sleeping Beauty paradox becomes incompatible with the tenability of the many-worlds interpretation.
Consider first the many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics, and in particular what happens when an observer measures the x-spin of a spin-1/2 particle whose state is an eigenstate of z-spin. According to the many-worlds interpretation, the observer branches into two successor observers, one of whom sees the result ‘spin up’ and the other of whom sees the result ‘spin down’. Call the original (pre-measurement) branch b0¬, the branch in which the observer sees ‘spin up’ b1, and the branch in which she sees ‘spin down’ b2. Compare this to a simplified version of the Sleeping Beauty paradox. Sleeping Beauty is woken up on Sunday, and told the following: “We will wake you for an hour on Monday, and for an hour on Tuesday, and on Monday night we will administer a drug that will cause you to forget the Monday waking.” Her room contains no indication of what day it is. Call the time at which she is awake on Sunday t0, on Monday t1¬, and on Tuesday t2.
Note the parallels between the two cases. In the many-worlds case, the agent at b0 is straightforwardly psychologically continuous with the agent at b1, and straightforwardly psychologically continuous with the agent at b2; however, the agents at b1 and b2 are not psychologically continuous with each other. Similarly in the Sleeping Beauty case, the agent at t0 is straightforwardly psychologically continuous with the agent at t1 and with the agent at t2, but the agents at t1 and t2 are not straightforwardly psychologically continuous with each other due to the memory erasure. That is, in each case the personal experience of the agent exhibits a branching structure.
Furthermore, note that in each case the agent gets lost in this branching structure. This is clearer in the Sleeping Beauty case; when she wakes up, she no longer knows whether it is Monday or Tuesday. That is, at t1 and t2 she is uncertain of the truth-value of some self-locating beliefs, such as “Today is Monday” (Elga 2000). She could use a probability measure to quantify this uncertainty; presumably she should assign a probability of 1/2 to “Today is Monday” on the basis of some kind of indifference principle. In the case of the many-worlds interpretation, the parallel uncertainty can be produced by supposing that the observer is blindfolded; at b1 and b2, she knows that the measurement has taken place, but she doesn’t know whether the result is ‘up’ or ‘down’ (Vaidman 2002a). Again, she is uncertain of the truth-value of some self-locating beliefs, such as “The result is ‘up’ in this branch” (Ismael 2003). And again, she could use a probability measure to quantify this uncertainty; she should assign a probability of 1/2 to the cited belief, on the basis of the Born rule.
Hence in both the many-worlds case and in the Sleeping Beauty case, there is a branching structure to subjective experience, which induces a loss of self-location information, and the resulting uncertainty can be quantified using a probability measure. However, there is also a significant difference between the two cases, namely in the treatment of probability before the branching event. According to the many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics, the observer should assign a probability of 1/2 to each measurement outcome even at b0. That is, the treatment of probability in the many-worlds case is just as if exactly one of the two outcomes occurs, where each outcome has an objective chance of 1/2. But there is no analogous pre-branching probability assignment in the Sleeping Beauty case; there is no sense in which Sleeping Beauty at t0 should assign a probability of 1/2 to each of Monday and Tuesday. To what beliefs could she assign such probabilities? “Today is Monday” has a probability of 0 at t0; she knows that today is Sunday. “I will wake up on Monday” has a probability of 1 at t0; she knows that she will wake up on Monday (or at least, that she is psychologically continuous with someone who will wake up on Monday). There are no obvious candidates for a belief about Monday to which Sleeping Beauty should assign a probability of 1/2 at t0. Hence the treatment of probability in the Sleeping Beauty case is not just as if she is woken up on exactly one of Monday and Tuesday with an objective chance of 1/2 each.
Of course, similar considerations can be raised in the many-worlds case, too. To what beliefs, at b0, can the observer assign a probability of 1/2? “The result is ‘up’ in this branch” has a probability of 0 at b0, since this branch (b0) contains no measurement results. “I will see the ‘up’ result” has a probability of 1, since the observer knows that she will see this result (or at least, that she is psychologically continuous with someone who will). Again, there are no obvious candidates for a belief concerning the results to which she should assign a probability of 1/2 at b0.
Nevertheless, many authors have argued that a pre-measurement probability assignment of 1/2 to the two results is appropriate in the many-worlds case. Saunders (1998) and Wallace (2005) argue that the branching structure of the observer’s experience makes the observer genuinely uncertain concerning what will happen to her; hence it makes sense for her to assign a probability of 1/2 to “I will see the ‘up’ result” at b0. Vaidman (2002a) argues that even though the observer is only genuinely uncertain after the measurement, nevertheless she should act as if she is uncertain even before the measurement, and this underwrites an effective probability assignment of 1/2 to “I will see the ‘up’ result” at b0. Papineau (2004) and Greaves (2004) argue that a probability assignment need have nothing to do with uncertainty; a probability assignment of 1/2 to “I will see the ‘up’ result” at b0 indicates how much the observer cares about her successor at b1 relative to her successor at b2.
My goal here is neither to defend nor to attack these argument strategies, but merely to note that they all remain controversial, and that if any such strategy works, it ought to work just as well in the structurally similar Sleeping Beauty case. That is, given the parallels between the two cases, then all other things being equal, we should expect the two cases to be covered by a uniform account of probability. But as it stands, the treatments of pre-branching probability are not parallel. This leaves us with two options—applying the treatment of pre-branching probability from the Sleeping Beauty case to the many-worlds case, and applying the many-worlds treatment to the Sleeping Beauty case.
According to the first option, the treatment of probability in the Sleeping Beauty case is correct; Sleeping Beauty should assign a probability of 1/2 to both “Today is Monday” and “Today is Tuesday” at t1 and at t2, but she should assign a probability of 1 to both “I will wake up on Monday” and “I will wake up on Tuesday” at t0. Applying this to the many-worlds case, the (blindfolded) observer should assign a probability of 1/2 to both “The result is ‘up’ in this branch” and “The result is ‘down’ in this branch” at b1 and b2, but she should assign a probability of 1 to both “I will see the ‘up’ result” and “I will see the ‘down’ result” at b0. The trouble with this option is that it fatal to the many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics; the observer’s pre-measurement predictions contradict the Born rule, which forms the empirical heart of quantum mechanics. That is, quantum mechanics requires that non-trivial probabilities be assigned to measurement results before the measurement has occurred, and if the many-worlds interpretation cannot deliver such probabilities, then it is untenable as an interpretation of quantum mechanics. Indeed, this is precisely why the authors cited above take such pains to try to justify pre-measurement probability assignments in the many-worlds interpretation.
So let us consider the second option, namely that the treatment of probability by the advocates of the many-worlds interpretation is correct. According to this option, the quantum observer should assign a probability of 1/2 to both “I will see the ‘up’ result” and “I will see the ‘down’ result” at b0, so analogously, Sleeping Beauty should assign a probability of 1/2 to both “I will wake up on Monday” and “I will wake up on Tuesday” at t0. That is, in both cases the branching process is treated as if it were an instance of objective chance, where just one branch occurs. This is highly counter-intuitive in the Sleeping Beauty case; as Elga notes, on Sunday Sleeping Beauty was “already certain that [she] would be awakened on Monday” (2000, 145). But perhaps our intuitions here are wrong, and perhaps one of the arguments mentioned above for the many-worlds case can show why they are wrong.
However, more is at stake here than our intuitions. To see this, consider the full Sleeping Beauty paradox, rather than the simplified version considered so far. On Sunday, Sleeping Beauty is told that a coin will be tossed. If the coin comes up tails, then she will be woken up on Monday and on Tuesday with memory erasure in between, as in the simplified version. If the coin comes up heads, then she will be woken up on Monday alone. (It doesn’t matter for present purposes if the coin toss is interpreted as a classical event described by objective chance or as a quantum event described by many-worlds branching.) The question at the heart of the paradox is what probability Sleeping Beauty should assign to ‘heads’ when she wakes up at t1. The dominant (‘thirder’) view is that the answer is 1/3 (Elga 2000); the minority (‘halfer’) view is that the answer is 1/2 (Lewis 2001).
Suppose we impose the treatment of probability required for the tenability of the many-worlds interpretation on the full Sleeping Beauty paradox. Recall that the treatment of probability here is as if each branch has an objective chance of 1/2 of occurring. In the Sleeping Beauty case, this means we can treat the situation as if Sleeping Beauty is told that when the coin comes up tails, she will be woken up either on Monday or on Tuesday, with equal (objective) probabilities. That is, we can treat the situation as if there are two coins tosses, where Sleeping Beauty will be woken up on Monday (but not Tuesday) if the first coin come up heads, on Monday (but not Tuesday) if the first comes up tails and the second comes up heads, and on Tuesday (but not Monday) if both come up tails. But if this is the right way to analyze the situation, then the paradox dissolves, and the halfer solution is clearly correct. After all, the motivation for the thirder solution is Sleeping Beauty’s rational expectation at t0 that she will be woken up twice as often if the (initial) coin-toss comes up tails as if it comes up heads. But on the current understanding of Sleeping Beauty’s rational expectations, there is no such asymmetry; whatever the result of the (initial) coin-toss, she expects to be woken up once, although if the result is tails then she is uncertain as to which day she will see.
This analysis is straightforwardly applicable if the account of probability in the many-worlds interpretation involves genuine pre-branching uncertainty (as Saunders (1998) and Wallace (1995) maintain). Given such uncertainty, Sleeping Beauty should treat equal-amplitude branching just like a classical coin-toss, and hence she should view her situation as just like the case of two consecutive coin-tosses just described. Put another way, if Sleeping Beauty is genuinely uncertain at t0 about whether, given that the (initial) coin-toss comes up tails, she will be woken up on Monday or on Tuesday, then her epistemic situation doesn’t change between t0 and t1¬. All that changes is her point of view; at t1, she is uncertain whether, given that the coin came up tails, she is currently awake on Monday or on Tuesday. But without a change in epistemic situation, there is no occasion for her to change the probability assigned to ‘heads’ between t0 and t1, and at t0 that probability is clearly 1/2.
But even if the account of probability in the many-worlds interpretation does not involve pre-branching uncertainty, all authors agree that the account must underwrite behavior exactly as if there was genuine uncertainty, in order for it to count as an account of probability (Greaves 2004, 442; Papineau 1996, 238; Vaidman 2002a). But in that case, Sleeping Beauty must behave exactly as if she is uncertain whether, given that the coin comes up tails, she will be woken up on Monday or on Tuesday. And part of behaving that way, as has just been argued, is being willing to bet on ‘heads’ at even odds at t1. Hence if the treatment of probability by the advocates of the many-worlds interpretation is correct, in any of its forms, then the dominant thirder solution to the Sleeping Beauty paradox must be rejected in favor of the halfer solution.
The argument here assumes that there is no disanalogy between the many-worlds case and the Sleeping Beauty case that could justify different treatment of probabilities. But this might be challenged. For example, in the many-worlds case, the probabilities are related to the amplitude of the branch via the Born rule, and there is nothing analogous to branch amplitude in the Sleeping Beauty case. But note that this disanalogy is unrelated to the question of whether the relevant probabilities can be assigned prior to the branching event, which is the question at issue here. If there are further disanalogies between the two cases, the argument needs to be made. Otherwise, the parallels between the cases constrain your options: If you are a thirder, you must reject the many-worlds interpretation, and conversely, if you accept the many-worlds interpretation you must be a halfer.
NATURAL BEAUTY
NATURAL BEAUTY
INTRODUCTION AND ANALYSIS
The natural beauty of Hawaii is a universally recognized characteristic and [as such is] one of [our] the most significant and valuable assets[.] of this island. In a relatively small area exists a great range of environments, from lush green tropical valleys to snow-capped mountains. [This diversity enhances the liveability of the island by providing a preference of physical settings.]
Hawaii's natural and scenic beauty is the [manifestation] result of the [interplay] interaction of various physical elements and forces. Three primary factors contribute to the variety of environments: elevation, relative location, and geologic origin and age. A further factor is modification by man. The types of landform and vegetation depend on these basic factors. Due to different elevations and locations of the island, the landscape features have particular characteristics. These include barren fields of lava, heavily vegetated valleys, kiawe deserts, native forests, rolling grasslands, and rocky coastlines. The differences in the environment and the landscape features are important in giving identity to areas of the island and [in supporting man made elements.] enhances the livability of the island by providing a preference of physical settings.
[As a resource, natural] Natural beauty [has many aspects.] is a multifaceted resource. It is an aesthetic resource experienced by human perceptions. [Natural and scenic beauty has] It is an economic [ramifications,] resource, as evidenced by the scale of resort development and by visitor related activities. Real property values [also] further substantiate the economic value of Hawaii's dramatic beauty. [The comparison of a shoreline or mountain home with a panoramic view to a home across the street; or a condominium overlooking mountains and ocean as to a view of a neighboring condominium reflects the importance of scenic beauty. Another aspect is that the] The physical elements [which] that make up the landscape and the interrelationships of these elements are also of scientific interest. Investigating and understanding the physical environment are necessary [in order] for man to live in [balance] harmony with [it and not destroy it.] the environment.
As the population increases, the desire to experience natural beauty will continue and may increase. If uncontrolled, the development necessary to accommodate an increasing population as well as resort development could have detrimental effects on the natural beauty of the island. Areas with special amenities of natural beauty have been and will continue to be the focus of pressure for resort development. Present regulatory process provide an assessment of impacts of development projects in order to protect, preserve and restore natural and scenic resources. [However, planning decisions lack standard methods for assessing aesthetic values and evaluating impacts. The cost of restoring or regaining natural beauty is greater than the cost of protecting it.]
Hawaii's natural beauty is both an irreplaceable asset and [an asset that is] a part of the public trust. It is fragile and although often enhanced by man can easily be adversely affected. Measures must be taken to insure its protection, both now and in the future, for the enjoyment of Hawaii's residents and visitors.
Through the Zoning and Subdivision [ordinances,] codes, and the Special Management Area and shoreline setback regulations, the County of Hawaii has the means to protect the island's natural and scenic beauty as an integral part of the living environment of the island. Safeguards of this valuable asset are a major consideration [of] for any construction or development [which] that may alter, eliminate, or intrude upon it. They are also important so that man-made elements are kept in an aesthetic perspective with the physical surroundings.
The County Arborist Advisory Committee was established to determine guidelines to identify the physical and botanical importance of trees and tree masses on the island. Criteria such as the aesthetic quality, rarity, cultural significance and endemic status are evaluated in designating exceptional trees or tree masses. Preservation for those selected are enacted by County ordinance or regulation.
The Hawaii County Planning Department adopted Rule 17 that implements landscaping requirements. The purpose of the rule is to use landscaping requirements to create screens and buffers from noise, lights, and litter; moderate the visual impact and microclimates of paved parking lots and parked vehicles; enhance the street scape of commercial and industrial areas; and promote ecological and cultural values through landscaping with native and other appropriate plants.
INTRODUCTION AND ANALYSIS
The natural beauty of Hawaii is a universally recognized characteristic and [as such is] one of [our] the most significant and valuable assets[.] of this island. In a relatively small area exists a great range of environments, from lush green tropical valleys to snow-capped mountains. [This diversity enhances the liveability of the island by providing a preference of physical settings.]
Hawaii's natural and scenic beauty is the [manifestation] result of the [interplay] interaction of various physical elements and forces. Three primary factors contribute to the variety of environments: elevation, relative location, and geologic origin and age. A further factor is modification by man. The types of landform and vegetation depend on these basic factors. Due to different elevations and locations of the island, the landscape features have particular characteristics. These include barren fields of lava, heavily vegetated valleys, kiawe deserts, native forests, rolling grasslands, and rocky coastlines. The differences in the environment and the landscape features are important in giving identity to areas of the island and [in supporting man made elements.] enhances the livability of the island by providing a preference of physical settings.
[As a resource, natural] Natural beauty [has many aspects.] is a multifaceted resource. It is an aesthetic resource experienced by human perceptions. [Natural and scenic beauty has] It is an economic [ramifications,] resource, as evidenced by the scale of resort development and by visitor related activities. Real property values [also] further substantiate the economic value of Hawaii's dramatic beauty. [The comparison of a shoreline or mountain home with a panoramic view to a home across the street; or a condominium overlooking mountains and ocean as to a view of a neighboring condominium reflects the importance of scenic beauty. Another aspect is that the] The physical elements [which] that make up the landscape and the interrelationships of these elements are also of scientific interest. Investigating and understanding the physical environment are necessary [in order] for man to live in [balance] harmony with [it and not destroy it.] the environment.
As the population increases, the desire to experience natural beauty will continue and may increase. If uncontrolled, the development necessary to accommodate an increasing population as well as resort development could have detrimental effects on the natural beauty of the island. Areas with special amenities of natural beauty have been and will continue to be the focus of pressure for resort development. Present regulatory process provide an assessment of impacts of development projects in order to protect, preserve and restore natural and scenic resources. [However, planning decisions lack standard methods for assessing aesthetic values and evaluating impacts. The cost of restoring or regaining natural beauty is greater than the cost of protecting it.]
Hawaii's natural beauty is both an irreplaceable asset and [an asset that is] a part of the public trust. It is fragile and although often enhanced by man can easily be adversely affected. Measures must be taken to insure its protection, both now and in the future, for the enjoyment of Hawaii's residents and visitors.
Through the Zoning and Subdivision [ordinances,] codes, and the Special Management Area and shoreline setback regulations, the County of Hawaii has the means to protect the island's natural and scenic beauty as an integral part of the living environment of the island. Safeguards of this valuable asset are a major consideration [of] for any construction or development [which] that may alter, eliminate, or intrude upon it. They are also important so that man-made elements are kept in an aesthetic perspective with the physical surroundings.
The County Arborist Advisory Committee was established to determine guidelines to identify the physical and botanical importance of trees and tree masses on the island. Criteria such as the aesthetic quality, rarity, cultural significance and endemic status are evaluated in designating exceptional trees or tree masses. Preservation for those selected are enacted by County ordinance or regulation.
The Hawaii County Planning Department adopted Rule 17 that implements landscaping requirements. The purpose of the rule is to use landscaping requirements to create screens and buffers from noise, lights, and litter; moderate the visual impact and microclimates of paved parking lots and parked vehicles; enhance the street scape of commercial and industrial areas; and promote ecological and cultural values through landscaping with native and other appropriate plants.
Black Beauty Assessment Test
There are two tasks. You must complete both of these.
You should read the extract two or three times before attempting the first task. You should approximately ten minutes on Task One.
TASK ONE
1) Whose point of view is the story being told from?
2) Write down three clues that tell us there is a fire in the stables.
3) Why did the horses refuse to be led out of the burning stables by the ostler?
4) Why did Black Beauty allow himself to be led out by James?
5) How did the fire start?
You should spend approximately thirty minutes on Task Two. You must choose one of the following two tasks only. Plan your writing for Task Two carefully before you begin.
TASK TWO
Write a newspaper article about the fire.
OR
Write a short story about children alone in a house when a fire is started.
You should read the extract two or three times before attempting the first task. You should approximately ten minutes on Task One.
TASK ONE
1) Whose point of view is the story being told from?
2) Write down three clues that tell us there is a fire in the stables.
3) Why did the horses refuse to be led out of the burning stables by the ostler?
4) Why did Black Beauty allow himself to be led out by James?
5) How did the fire start?
You should spend approximately thirty minutes on Task Two. You must choose one of the following two tasks only. Plan your writing for Task Two carefully before you begin.
TASK TWO
Write a newspaper article about the fire.
OR
Write a short story about children alone in a house when a fire is started.
Beauty
Beauty
I shall discuss several related issues about beauty. These are: (1) The place of beauty among other aesthetic properties. (2) The general principle of aesthetic supervenience. (3) The problem of aesthetic relevance. (4) The distinction between free and dependent beauty. (5) The primacy of our appreciation of free beauty over our appreciation of dependent beauty. (6) Personal beauty as a species of beauty. (7) The metaphysics of beauty.
§1. The Notion of the Aesthetic
In contemporary philosophy, beauty is often thought of as one among many other aesthetic properties, albeit it one with a special role. I think this is a useful way of thinking about beauty, so long as we don’t lose sight of the beauty’s specialness. For our thought about beauty is indeed closely connected with our thinking in more broadly aesthetic terms. Hence let us begin by looking at the category of the aesthetic and the place of beauty within it.
Which properties are aesthetic properties? Beauty and ugliness would be thought to be uncontroversial examples of aesthetic properties. They are paradigm cases. But what about daintiness, dumpiness and elegance? What about the sadness or vigour of music? What about representational properties, such as being of a cow or of London Bridge? What about being mostly yellow or in C minor? What about art-historical properties, such as being a Cubist painting? Is there a principle at work that allows us to classify some of these as aesthetic properties and others as nonaesthetic properties?
Someone might follow this question with this question: is such a distinction as it were built into the world? Is it just a fact a metaphysical fact that some properties are aesthetic and some are not? Or is it a distinction that we should draw only if we find it useful to do so? That is, is it more pragmatic than natural? Then again, perhaps this is a false dilemma. For it may be that the aesthetic/nonaesthetic distinction is in some sense natural, but our main evidence for thinking it so is that we find it useful to mark such a distinction.
However, some have argued that the distinction is in fact not useful. There has been a debate initiated by Frank Sibley, about whether aesthetic concepts can be distinguished from nonaesthetic concepts (Sibley 1959, 1965). Notable contributors to that debate were Ted Cohen and Peter Kivy (Cohen 1973, Kivy 1975). (This debate was about aesthetic concepts, but there is a similar debate about aesthetic properties.) Sibley thought that there was a significant distinction between aesthetic and nonaesthetic concepts. He thought that aesthetic concepts were those that required 'taste' or 'discernment' for their application. But these faculties were in turn characterised in aesthetic terms. His critics pointed out that this way of distinguishing aesthetic concepts from nonaesthetic concepts led to too tight a circle. The consensus among contemporary aestheticians is that the distinction is somewhat arbitrary and hard to make out.
My own view is that Sibley can be rescued (Zangwill 2001a, chapter 2). There is a principled way of distinguishing aesthetic from nonaesthetic concepts and properties. The distinction is useful, and it marks a real difference between different kinds of concepts and properties. The strategy is: (a) to see judgements of beauty as pre-eminent among other aesthetic concepts and properties; (b) to give a distinctive account of beauty and judgements of beauty; and (c) to locate a necessary link between judgements of beauty and the other aesthetic judgements, which does not obtain between judgements of beauty and nonaesthetic judgements.
I shall discuss several related issues about beauty. These are: (1) The place of beauty among other aesthetic properties. (2) The general principle of aesthetic supervenience. (3) The problem of aesthetic relevance. (4) The distinction between free and dependent beauty. (5) The primacy of our appreciation of free beauty over our appreciation of dependent beauty. (6) Personal beauty as a species of beauty. (7) The metaphysics of beauty.
§1. The Notion of the Aesthetic
In contemporary philosophy, beauty is often thought of as one among many other aesthetic properties, albeit it one with a special role. I think this is a useful way of thinking about beauty, so long as we don’t lose sight of the beauty’s specialness. For our thought about beauty is indeed closely connected with our thinking in more broadly aesthetic terms. Hence let us begin by looking at the category of the aesthetic and the place of beauty within it.
Which properties are aesthetic properties? Beauty and ugliness would be thought to be uncontroversial examples of aesthetic properties. They are paradigm cases. But what about daintiness, dumpiness and elegance? What about the sadness or vigour of music? What about representational properties, such as being of a cow or of London Bridge? What about being mostly yellow or in C minor? What about art-historical properties, such as being a Cubist painting? Is there a principle at work that allows us to classify some of these as aesthetic properties and others as nonaesthetic properties?
Someone might follow this question with this question: is such a distinction as it were built into the world? Is it just a fact a metaphysical fact that some properties are aesthetic and some are not? Or is it a distinction that we should draw only if we find it useful to do so? That is, is it more pragmatic than natural? Then again, perhaps this is a false dilemma. For it may be that the aesthetic/nonaesthetic distinction is in some sense natural, but our main evidence for thinking it so is that we find it useful to mark such a distinction.
However, some have argued that the distinction is in fact not useful. There has been a debate initiated by Frank Sibley, about whether aesthetic concepts can be distinguished from nonaesthetic concepts (Sibley 1959, 1965). Notable contributors to that debate were Ted Cohen and Peter Kivy (Cohen 1973, Kivy 1975). (This debate was about aesthetic concepts, but there is a similar debate about aesthetic properties.) Sibley thought that there was a significant distinction between aesthetic and nonaesthetic concepts. He thought that aesthetic concepts were those that required 'taste' or 'discernment' for their application. But these faculties were in turn characterised in aesthetic terms. His critics pointed out that this way of distinguishing aesthetic concepts from nonaesthetic concepts led to too tight a circle. The consensus among contemporary aestheticians is that the distinction is somewhat arbitrary and hard to make out.
My own view is that Sibley can be rescued (Zangwill 2001a, chapter 2). There is a principled way of distinguishing aesthetic from nonaesthetic concepts and properties. The distinction is useful, and it marks a real difference between different kinds of concepts and properties. The strategy is: (a) to see judgements of beauty as pre-eminent among other aesthetic concepts and properties; (b) to give a distinctive account of beauty and judgements of beauty; and (c) to locate a necessary link between judgements of beauty and the other aesthetic judgements, which does not obtain between judgements of beauty and nonaesthetic judgements.
BEAUTY BEHIND BARBED WIRE:
BEAUTY BEHIND BARBED WIRE:
The Relocation Camp Experience of Estelle Ishigo
Creator: Madeline Antilla
Grade level recommendation: 9, 10, 11, and 12
Time required: 4 days (Lessons may be done individually.)
Unit Overview
Artist Estelle Ishigo, the European American wife of a Japanese American, was among the American citizens forced out of California during World War II. Ishigo and her husband, Arthur, were first sent to Pomona Assembly Center and later to Heart Mountain Relocation Center, in a remote area of Wyoming. There, Estelle Ishigo continued her work as a painter. This unit focuses on Ishigo's artwork, which provides a rare inside look at life in these camps. Students use primary sources to learn how internees lived and made a home under incredibly constrained circumstances.
Historical Background
When the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, World War II was already in its second year. The surprise bombing put the United States into a panic and resulted in the immediate Declaration of War by President Franklin D. Roosevelt. America joined the Allied Forces, with England and Russia, to fight against the Axis Powers, led by Germany, Italy, and Japan.
Longstanding prejudice in our country against Japanese Americans combined with newly inflamed fear and distrust to create unprecedented heights of hysteria. The success of the attack on Pearl Harbor was thought to be the result of espionage by Japanese Americans in Hawaii and on the West Coast. Newspaper articles and pressure groups called for the expulsion of all Japanese Americans.
Evacuation: On February 19, 1942, President Roosevelt issued Executive Order 9066, which dramatically changed the lives of 120,000 civilians of Japanese descent. This order authorized military commanders to remove civilians, primarily Japanese Americans, from designated "military zones." These areas were mainly along the US Pacific Coast, where most Japanese Americans resided. Lt. General John L. DeWitt, in charge of the Western Defense Command at this time, singled out Japanese American residents in the western region to be subjected to curfews and called for their "voluntary" evacuation. One of his first steps was to identify leaders of Japanese American community groups, and to send them to isolation camps. On March 19, 1942, General DeWitt called for a more mandatory evacuation, and eventually internment between 1942 and 1945 (see Chronology) of all residents of California, Oregon, Washington, and parts of Arizona who were as little as 1/16th Japanese. Of the 120,000 people who were ordered to leave their homes and businesses, two-thirds were US citizens by birth (Asian immigrants were not allowed to become citizens until 1952). These men, women, and children were told that this removal to remote, undesirable locations was for their own protection. By contrast, very few Americans of German or Italian ancestry were rounded up and forcibly moved. As later years would tell, not a single Japanese American was found guilty of either treason or espionage.
The first phase of evacuation began in March 1942, when families were transported on notice as short as 48 hours to trains that took them to hastily organized assembly centers in five western states. These were frequently located at racetracks or fairgrounds. Detainees were housed in cramped spaces (sometimes livestock stalls) with inadequate ventilation, power, privacy, and sanitary conditions. Food and medicine were also in short supply. In these first steps of relocation, detainees were guarded by military personnel in guard towers “for their own safety.” The evacuees were allowed to bring with them items listed by government order, but only what they could carry. Other property (including homes, businesses, land, boats, personal possessions) was stored, sold, abandoned, or left in the trust of non-Japanese friends. Some was recovered after the war, but much was not.
Internment and Relocation: The second phase moved large groups, mainly by train, to permanent concentration camps (later to be called internment camps). When the plan for relocation was completed, 10 camps in seven states were in full operation. Those facilities that were located in desert areas were inescapably hot and dusty, reaching temperatures of over 100 degrees F. People in northern camps fought sub-zero winters. The internment camps were surrounded by barbed wire and guard towers. Armed military guards patrolled the perimeter and were instructed to shoot anyone attempting to leave.
Life in the camps was organized around lines: lines for meals, clothing, mail and still more lines to use bathing and restroom facilities. Because of the cramped conditions, the nature of the family changed dramatically. Young members spent more time with their peers, and less with their elders. Rules came from outside the family, eroding family structure and challenging the authority of parents. Morale was an issue. Steps were taken to provide education, work, and other activities for the internees. Some were organized by the Japanese Americans themselves and some was provided by the on-site military organization. Each camp varied, as did each person's experience.
End of Camps: As World War II began to draw to a close, President Roosevelt provided for the return home of internees by ending the exclusion of Japanese Americans from the West Coast (December 17, 1944). Many returned to find their property greatly devalued or in the hands of others. All faced the challenge of rebuilding their lives as individuals, as families, and as a community within the fabric of postwar American life.
Because there are 120,000 different stories from within the camps, none of them should be considered typical. No single account of life there adequately expresses the experience. One story, however — that of Estelle Ishigo — brings with it a wealth of artwork and documentation.
The Relocation Camp Experience of Estelle Ishigo
Creator: Madeline Antilla
Grade level recommendation: 9, 10, 11, and 12
Time required: 4 days (Lessons may be done individually.)
Unit Overview
Artist Estelle Ishigo, the European American wife of a Japanese American, was among the American citizens forced out of California during World War II. Ishigo and her husband, Arthur, were first sent to Pomona Assembly Center and later to Heart Mountain Relocation Center, in a remote area of Wyoming. There, Estelle Ishigo continued her work as a painter. This unit focuses on Ishigo's artwork, which provides a rare inside look at life in these camps. Students use primary sources to learn how internees lived and made a home under incredibly constrained circumstances.
Historical Background
When the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, World War II was already in its second year. The surprise bombing put the United States into a panic and resulted in the immediate Declaration of War by President Franklin D. Roosevelt. America joined the Allied Forces, with England and Russia, to fight against the Axis Powers, led by Germany, Italy, and Japan.
Longstanding prejudice in our country against Japanese Americans combined with newly inflamed fear and distrust to create unprecedented heights of hysteria. The success of the attack on Pearl Harbor was thought to be the result of espionage by Japanese Americans in Hawaii and on the West Coast. Newspaper articles and pressure groups called for the expulsion of all Japanese Americans.
Evacuation: On February 19, 1942, President Roosevelt issued Executive Order 9066, which dramatically changed the lives of 120,000 civilians of Japanese descent. This order authorized military commanders to remove civilians, primarily Japanese Americans, from designated "military zones." These areas were mainly along the US Pacific Coast, where most Japanese Americans resided. Lt. General John L. DeWitt, in charge of the Western Defense Command at this time, singled out Japanese American residents in the western region to be subjected to curfews and called for their "voluntary" evacuation. One of his first steps was to identify leaders of Japanese American community groups, and to send them to isolation camps. On March 19, 1942, General DeWitt called for a more mandatory evacuation, and eventually internment between 1942 and 1945 (see Chronology) of all residents of California, Oregon, Washington, and parts of Arizona who were as little as 1/16th Japanese. Of the 120,000 people who were ordered to leave their homes and businesses, two-thirds were US citizens by birth (Asian immigrants were not allowed to become citizens until 1952). These men, women, and children were told that this removal to remote, undesirable locations was for their own protection. By contrast, very few Americans of German or Italian ancestry were rounded up and forcibly moved. As later years would tell, not a single Japanese American was found guilty of either treason or espionage.
The first phase of evacuation began in March 1942, when families were transported on notice as short as 48 hours to trains that took them to hastily organized assembly centers in five western states. These were frequently located at racetracks or fairgrounds. Detainees were housed in cramped spaces (sometimes livestock stalls) with inadequate ventilation, power, privacy, and sanitary conditions. Food and medicine were also in short supply. In these first steps of relocation, detainees were guarded by military personnel in guard towers “for their own safety.” The evacuees were allowed to bring with them items listed by government order, but only what they could carry. Other property (including homes, businesses, land, boats, personal possessions) was stored, sold, abandoned, or left in the trust of non-Japanese friends. Some was recovered after the war, but much was not.
Internment and Relocation: The second phase moved large groups, mainly by train, to permanent concentration camps (later to be called internment camps). When the plan for relocation was completed, 10 camps in seven states were in full operation. Those facilities that were located in desert areas were inescapably hot and dusty, reaching temperatures of over 100 degrees F. People in northern camps fought sub-zero winters. The internment camps were surrounded by barbed wire and guard towers. Armed military guards patrolled the perimeter and were instructed to shoot anyone attempting to leave.
Life in the camps was organized around lines: lines for meals, clothing, mail and still more lines to use bathing and restroom facilities. Because of the cramped conditions, the nature of the family changed dramatically. Young members spent more time with their peers, and less with their elders. Rules came from outside the family, eroding family structure and challenging the authority of parents. Morale was an issue. Steps were taken to provide education, work, and other activities for the internees. Some were organized by the Japanese Americans themselves and some was provided by the on-site military organization. Each camp varied, as did each person's experience.
End of Camps: As World War II began to draw to a close, President Roosevelt provided for the return home of internees by ending the exclusion of Japanese Americans from the West Coast (December 17, 1944). Many returned to find their property greatly devalued or in the hands of others. All faced the challenge of rebuilding their lives as individuals, as families, and as a community within the fabric of postwar American life.
Because there are 120,000 different stories from within the camps, none of them should be considered typical. No single account of life there adequately expresses the experience. One story, however — that of Estelle Ishigo — brings with it a wealth of artwork and documentation.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)
